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FRANCIS BACON 
AND THE I D E A L  C O M M O N W E A L T H  
course is a sort of drama in which Bacon is made 
THIS to appear in the various characters that he so notably 
portrayed in his life. H i s  two appearances preceding the 
present occasion, and the two still t o  come, have all the 
measure of major r6les. But Bacon as protagonist of an 
ideal commonwealth is only a minor character. There  is 
for this part  but one fragment of his writings, the “New 
Atlantis”, standing among works of stupendous range and 
significance. I n  his public life, in his acts and expressions, 
Bacon seemed to  fail entirely to  prevision, or even to  desire, 
social and political change in the England of his day. H e  
disregarded the adumbrations of that struggle which was to 
constitute the history of his country for near a hundred 
years. H e  did his utmost to  stem what was soon to  prove 
an irresistible tide sweeping Parliament and people into 
new regions of political liberty. H e  was, to  the end of his 
days, champion of the royal prerogative in its most reac- 
tionary and absolute construction. H e  linked his personal 
fortunes to  the Elizabethan regime, and to  the Stuart 
dynasty, and he prosecuted, with an almost fanatical zeal, 
any and all who lifted voice or hand against the royal 
authority. And some of those who felt the weight of his 
power and his almost unexampled legal skill had been his 
friends and benefactors in the long years of waiting while 
he sought royal favor and the mantle of public office. 
I t  is, indeed, an open question to what extent Bacon’s 
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public actions expressed his views of politics, and whether 
they did not flow, rather, f rom the conception of his per- 
sonal career which dominated him from beginning to  end, 
and which has left it open to  history to  characterize him 
as a mean and corrupt sycophant. I t  is, however, fair t o  
believe that  i f  Bacon had held a political philosophy as 
noble in intention and as profoundly a par t  of himself as 
the natural philosophy to  which he devoted every spare 
moment and thought, his public life would have worn a 
different aspect. There  is even reason, as we shall see, for  
the belief that  Bacon’s social and political conceptions were 
quite of a piece with his public life and his relationship to  
the political factors of his time. If these three hundred 
years had not intervened and carried the world immeas- 
urably beyond the England of Elizabeth and James I ;  if on 
the contrary, an absolute monarchy had received the justi- 
fication of success and historical persistence, we might now 
be giving him the same acclaim with respect to  his political 
attitude as  we give to  his enunciation of those transforming 
principles which bridged the world from medizval super- 
stition to  our age of the mastery of nature. If we may state 
it crudely, one half of Bacon guessed correctly, and the 
other half wrongly, as t o  what history was going to  do. 
I t  may be that we can give Bacon’s practical political 
philosophy-for h,e never stated a theoretical one-an even 
larger measure of justification. After all, the government of 
Elizabeth and the Stuarts represented an enormous stride 
forward when measured against that  of only two centuries 
before. Reactionary as it seems, it was pregnant with all 
those movements which carried the world forward to mod- 
ern principles and institutions. My colleagues who de- 
scribe Bacon’s contribution to  the history of science will 
probably admit that  it had only a relative importance; that  
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his methods of research were mostly wrong; that he made 
no individual discoveries of particular importance ; that  he 
was not even a part  of that  great army whose vanguard had 
already made a measurable advance. Perhaps it is because 
political change so often comes through violence and leaves 
behind an atmosphere of deadly hatred that we are so in- 
clined t o  regard with favor or disfavor the supporter of a 
position identical with, or opposed to, our own. 
W e  have therefore only the most meager material on 
which to  base a statement of Bacon’s political philosophy. 
His voluminous writings on other subjects give us not even 
hints of a social theory. W e  have only the facts of his pub- 
lic life, his consistent political practice, on the one hand, 
and on the other, a fragment portraying a Utopia which 
nowhere describes a political system, and gives only the 
scantiest account of social usages. I t  is principally the fact 
that  he was a Utopian, which supplies us a basis for inter- 
pretation. Obviously then, our task is t o  paint the kind of 
background which will enable us to  understand Bacon’s atti- 
tude, even if we have to  assume that his principles were 
unconscious. But the painting of any historical setting is 
an enormously complex affair for which few have the mate- 
rials o r  the skill. Certainly not too much should be ex- 
pected for that  particular moment in European history. 
Bacon’s attitude and acts as a servant of the Crown place 
him very definitely anterior to  all those movements that 
led to popular sovereignty. H i s  death in 1626 was only 
two years before the acceptance of the Petition of Right. 
Indeed, his own downfall as Chancellor, so utterly unjust 
t o  him as an individual, was a first great swing of the peo- 
ple against an irresponsible and corrupt government. T h e  
real attack was not upon him, but upon the Crown and the 
kings’ favorites. 
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T h e  new political philosophy which animated the whole 
succession of events for the next two centuries, and, indeed, 
t o  our time, was one to which he was completely a stranger. 
T h e  Reformation gave fixation to the concept of individual- 
ism as the basis of political organization. It was most 
natural to  conceive such organization as deriving from con- 
tract, so the thought of the next two centuries was domi- 
nated by the great contract philosophers. Individualism 
and contract are an adequate theoretical basis for the whole 
sequence of popular upheavals, By the same curious con- 
tradiction, Bacon was reared in the most intense atmos- 
phere of Puritanism, in that very essence of the Reforma- 
tion that in a few years was to  alter the whole political 
complexion of England. But he did not go forward with 
it, o r  catch any of its practical implications. Though upon 
the last jutting promontory, he belonged to  an older order. 
T h e  Baconian politics may be regarded as the practical 
counterpart of Machiavelli’s theory, and as thus exempli- 
fying the earliest political philosophy of the Renaissance. 
This  is a matter of extreme simplicity once its premises and 
implications are understood. It may be described as a 
theory of government of the barnyard type, or as rule 
exercised upon material that is essentially disorderly and 
unable to  care for itself. If this major premise is under- 
stood, the rest follows naturally. Picture yourself as re- 
sponsible for  the care and control of a herd of animals. 
You will of necessity believe in, and act according to  cer- 
tain principles. First of all, the control of this herd is 
supremely necessary for its own good. Secondly, the value 
of any governmental method is measured by the degree of 
its success. You will entice your animals from one location 
to another without any scruple about deceiving them. You 
are perfectly aware that all of your animals must be kept in 
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order through intimidation. You never go among them 
without your stock whip to engender fear. Indeed, in- 
timidation is the fundamental method of dealing with all 
dangerous animals, Furthermore, every animal acts first 
and last through its individual motives. I t  struggles for  
what it conceives to  be benefits. 
If you believe with reference to  a people, that  its be- 
havior is always personal behavior, that  it is actuated by 
the primary personal motives, if you are unacquainted with 
social self-control through community of habit or custom, 
you will inevitably accept the political teachings of Machia- 
velli. You will conceive government as a thing separate 
and independent, imposed upon a people as the first re- 
quirement of its own good. This  separately integral thing 
may be the greatest of God-given blessings to  humanity. 
This  arrangement of human affairs must have a deriva- 
tion from outside the people themselves. This point of 
view regards only personal motives and disregards or mini- 
mizes social forces. There must therefore be a set of in- 
struments who by divine right, or historical causation, or 
special competence, have the task of administering the prin- 
ciples of government which in themselves are  sacred and 
independent. Successful government depends therefore 
upon mediation, and the instruments of mediation are  cre- 
ated primarily by birth, but partly by special training. 
These instruments are princes and their official families. 
T h e  good prince is the one who governs successfully, 
observing always the welfare af his subjects, for which 
they themselves are, of course, unable to  provide. H i s  
methods must, whenever possible, be kindly; but they must 
always be firm. H e  must use expediency by giving ear t o  
grievances and by acceding to  the wishes of subjects, when 
this accords with his own superior purposes. 
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This philosophy, moreover, assumes that  there are  fixed 
and permanent principles of government which may best be 
discovered by a study of their operation in specific cases. 
Wha t  has proved successful in the governments of the past 
is t o  be taken and used in all the procedure of the future. 
In  other words, the system of political principles is a static 
thing. I t  has merely to  be learned and skillfully applied. 
A commonwealth may be outfitted with a body of wise laws 
by a superlatively skillful lawgiver, and then run its course 
through the centuries without modification of this code, and 
with never more than the problem of appropriate applica- 
tion. 
I t  is a fair interpretation of Bacon’s public life that  he 
genuinely believed in political principles of the Machiavel- 
lian type. H e  was much wiser than his sovereigns, and 
repeatedly, in his memorials addressed to  them, urged poli- 
cies which, while never compromising royal authority, 
showed ways whereby the monarchy could adjust itself to  
popular attitudes and movements, and thus avoid much of 
the odium that  attends the exercise of coercive authority. 
While there remains the doubt to  what extent Bacon was 
consulting the conditions of his personal fortune, there is 
still good reason to  believe that he had a genuine sense of 
public duty, which should even override considerations of 
friendship. Certainly he discharged the labors of his office 
with unfailing conscientiousness, and the devotion to  his 
rulers, which he continuously proclaimed, must have meant 
more than the effusive pretensions of a place hunter. In  
brief, Bacon considered himself a good citizen, and with 
him as with all Machiavellians, the good citizen is the good 
subject. T h e  test of good citizenship soon changed, and 
Bacon has been measured by a scale which he did not even 
conceive as existing. 
62 Lectures on Francis Bacon 
W e  shall now endeavor to  interpret Bacon’s social con- 
ceptions as expressed in his Utopian fragment, the “New 
Atlantis”. This  takes the usual form of the report of a 
visitor t o  a region hitherto undiscovered, and which, in its 
isolation, had learned the perfect adjustment of human rela- 
tions. In  this case, a ship sailing into the Pacific is driven 
to  an isIand where the visitors are treated with every kind- 
ness, and to  whom, in a series of discourses, the operation of 
affairs is described. 
T h e  “New Atlantis” is not distinguished from any other 
commonwealth by any peculiarity of its traditional culture, 
as this is found t o  be Christian, and therefore largely the 
same as that  of a European country. The  difference lies 
in that the wisdom of some of its princes had discovered the 
enormous benefits of knowledge of nature, and had so 
organized the commonwealth that research into the secrets 
of nature and the making them available for human uses 
had become the chief of all public functions. An institu- 
tion known as the House of Solomon, a combination of a 
research university with a kind of monastic order, was main- 
tained as a means by which the processes and forces of 
nature could be made servants of human welfare. Much of 
the actual arrangements for  research seem to us merely 
fantastic, but here is expressed a clear and marvelously 
comprehensive view of public provision for  experimental 
science, and the enormous practical benefits that  could 
flow from it. 
Regarding this commonwealth nothing is said of govern- 
ment, it being assumed that  this is the work of good and 
wise princes. T h e  only description of social organization 
is little more than that of a strong and solid family system 
af ter  the pattern of the patriarchate. The  matter of real 
importance is that here is a human group, building its 
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arrangements and securing its welfare on the basis of scien- 
tific knowledge. T h e  “New Atlantis” is therefore a Utopia 
after the formula of salvation by knowledge. 
Although the “New Atlantis” represents a marvelous 
foresight of the part  t o  be played by science in human 
affairs, this by itself fails t o  provide a social philosophy. 
I t  is the fact that Bacon was a Utopian that gives us in- 
sight into his principles. W e  must therefore inquire into 
the significance of Utopianism as such, First of all it is 
a product of creative imagination exercised upon the sys- 
tem of human affairs. W e  are quite familiar from daily 
observation with the ways in which imagination dramatizes 
particular phases of life. It is seen in representations of the 
world’s dominant concepts such as creation, maternity, 
youth, loyalty, honor and goodness. Human thought con- 
cerned with these provides material with which the imagina- 
tion delineates them in concrete forms represented and sym- 
bolized in story, poetry, sculpture o r  painting. W e  are 
further familiar with the ways in which youth dramatizes 
the personal career, providing in this way fixation of pur- 
pose and setting in operation the motives of personal ambi- 
tion. Examples in the social field are to  be seen in every 
case of projected reform. T h e  world is pictured as real- 
izing in some feature its capacity for improvement. Youth 
is prolific of these efforts a t  betterment. Not yet discour- 
aged by the harsh failures that come from attempts a t  
realization, not yet hardened into cynicism, youth, seeing 
vividly and desiring ardently, is perhaps the greatest force 
by which the world makes its advances. Make  this attitude 
towards social matters sufficiently comprehensive, and you 
have a Utopia. Every person interested in social better- 
ment is to  that extent a Utopian. 
I t  is next t o  be noted that social dramatization of the 
64 Lectures on Francis Bacon 
Utopian kind involves the future. T h e  control and direc- 
tion of all action involves an end not yet attained. Directed 
operations are always telic, observant of objectives fore- 
seen but unrealized. Every plan which involves concerted 
or cooperative action must be purposive, determined, back- 
ward, so to  speak, out of the future. 
A few years ago Mr. Wells delivered a notable lecture 
before the Royal Institution in which he laid it down as 
the duty of science to look forward into the future as well 
as backward into the past. I t  is of greater importance to  
know what will happen to  human beings fifty, a hundred, a 
thousand years hence, than what has happened to  them a t  
similar intervals in history. Moreover, in proportion as 
science is accurate and sure of its ground, it undertakes the 
predictive function. 
T h e  direction of affairs from the point of view of future 
and unrealized ends is familiar in every political move- 
ment. Parties are built upon platforms which are nothing 
more than declarations of intention, plans of action. T h e  
center of gravity of a democracy is always located in time 
yet to come. W e  discover in this manner that Utopianism 
variously modified is by no means exceptional, is indeed a 
universally present and active principle of personal and 
public affairs. W e  may therefore well inquire how it re- 
lates itself to a thoroughgoing conception of social action 
and organization. W h a t  kind of social and political phi- 
losophy can include Utopianism as one of its consistent 
parts ? 
T h e  first and only thoroughgoing philosophy that gave 
a place to  Utopianism was that of Plato. I t  is commonly 
known as Idealism. Plato conceived the universe as con- 
sisting primarily of ideas, and, secondarily, of their copies. 
Confronted by a world of things, persons, and affairs which 
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unfailingly impress the observer with their inherent imper- 
fection, he believes that there exists somewhere, transcend- 
ing the region of tangibilities, another world in which all 
of these things are found in their perfect state. These 
perfect ideas are dimly sensed, and the effort is made to 
translate them into more and more perfect copies. W h a t  
the craftsman or artist strives to  do with things, those 
concerned with political and social matters also strive to  
attain and so are working always toward an approxima- 
tion to  the perfect social order. I t  is their concern to  build 
states a f te r  the transcendental pattern which is the embodi- 
ment of reality. H i s  myth of the cave, on the walls of 
which we see shadows cast by the realities passing outside, 
has its equal application to  societies and states. 
In  harmony with this philosophy, he presents us his own 
vision of the perfect state and describes the kind of instru- 
ments by which social raw material may be continuously 
shaped toward that perfect pattern. These are the “guar- 
dians”, set apart, like poet or sculptor, for this special serv- 
ice. By a communism which enables them freely to  give 
their services to directing the affairs of the commonwealth, 
namely, the personal needs of property and family that 
dominate the raw material. 
H e r e  is t o  be noted first the projection into the future, 
or the transcendentally distant, of conditions conceived as 
perfect and therefore fixed and static; secondly, a machinery 
of mediation to  link perfection back to  resistant and dis- 
orderly raw material. 
T w o  things are impressive in the history of Platonic 
thought. One is that  it was immediately succeeded by its 
almost complete antithesis in that of Aristotle; and sec- 
ondly that in various modifications, Platonism has largely 
dominated the history of European civilization. I t s  most 
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familiar example is found in the Christian system of the- 
ology. Every historian knows that Christianity, as taught 
by Jesus, however new to  the world and however powerful 
as a social force, was in itself a very simple set of teachings 
about the relationships of man to  God and of men to  one 
another. This new and vital body of ethics was, in the 
course of the next four centuries, built into a philosophical 
structure which gave it t o  history in the form of the great 
Creeds. This  philosophical framework was Platonism. 
Here  again we see a transcendental perfection, a kingdom 
of heaven located not “within you” but in the distant and 
the future; here, again, the mediators, not now the guar- 
dians of the state, but especially selected agents for con- 
necting the divinely perfect back to  resistant raw material. 
By the Apostolic succession and by others divinely called, 
the Church takes on its mediatorial function. Note that 
perfection is fixed once for all, and all man can d o  is to  
approximate it as nearly as may be by the procedure which 
the mediators set and keep in operation. 
T h e  other important fact about Platonism is the imme- 
diate appearance of Aristotle. T h e  Aristotelian view of 
nature and society is so transforming and so prolific that  
it can never be neglected by those who wish to  understand 
their kind. H e r e  the system of universals which Plato 
had conceived as separate and independent ideals, are con- 
sidered inherent in the things to  which they pertain. They 
are the factors of meaning discoverable because of their 
rationality, by which the universe is held together and of 
which things are the expression. Causation is not now in- 
tervention from afar,  but operation through the nature of 
things themselves. Here  we have stated almost in a stroke 
that conception of nature which has become so familiar in 
modern times. 
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Wi th  this view, the social order is not constituted by 
wise men who fix relationships upon raw material, but these 
relationships are inherent in the nature of human beings, 
and merely express themselves in a society. Given the two 
primary relationships, that of man and woman, and that of 
master and servant, which Aristotle considered undeniably 
natural, the various branches and twigs grow out of these 
great trunks. H e r e  again it is not so much what Aristotle 
taught as what is implied in his teaching that ultimately 
counts. I t  is the doctrine of inherent and sequential causa- 
tion, the principle found so prolific of results when used in 
the study of nature or man. Obviously, an interpretation of 
society which uses Aristotelian principles will be the antith- 
esis of Platonism, and therefore of Utopianism. And as 
these principles when become modern are those employed 
in scientific study of the social order, we are compelled to  
broaden our inquiry. 
While the Aristotelian naturalism grew quickly with the 
Renaissance and fruited in the scientific study of natural 
processes, it only slowly found its way into the interpreta- 
tion of society. M a n  seemed so obviously separate from 
the rest of the world. H e ,  being rational, appeared anti- 
thetical to  matters of time and space. H o w  could mind be 
in any sense continuous with matter? 
I t  was Bodin who first among Renaissance scholars ap- 
plied the new view and methods to  social affairs. H e  saw 
that men placed under varying conditions of environment, 
which determined livelihood and welfare, produced differ- 
ent social forms and types of culture. But, strangely, his 
was hut a single voice. T h e  contract philosophers held the 
field, and contract is clearly not a matter of growth but a 
voluntary event. It was not until Montesquieu laid the 
groundwork of modern social science in his “Spirit of the 
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Laws” by showing how completely social formations are  
determined by reaction t o  natural environment, that the 
social order came to  be understood as a process of growth. 
From this time on, ever broader reaches of human organiza- 
tion found their explanation through the inherent causation 
of social forces. T h e  modern formula that explanation of 
anything must show the conditions under which it arises, 
and the causative sequence of which it is a part ,  dominated 
the studies of human society. Soon a new history came 
into being, and one after the other of the human sciences 
moved from the philosophical into the scientific camp. 
In  social science proper, Herbert  Spencer built a com- 
plete and consistent system on the new principles. With 
him, voluntarism definitely leaves the stage. Human affairs 
a re  continuous with those of nature, and are as capable of 
explanation by anterior causation as any natural fact. This  
point of view leads, of course, t o  the conclusion that  efforts 
t o  modify the operation of social forces are as futile as 
attempts to  change the course of the forces of nature. T h e  
only possible attitude is one of laissez-faire. Social reform 
is not only useless but foolish as well. Social operations, 
like those of nature, take care of themselves. 
An even more perfect example of the determinist o r  natu- 
ralist point of view is the work of William Graham Sumner. 
W h a t  he calls “folkways” are  the deep-lying, unconscious, 
and all but irresistible determinants of human conduct. 
In  convention and custom, in the mores, he finds social 
action shaped without thought or  choice. These forces are 
capable of slight modification, but this only through long 
periods in which natural change submerges voluntary effort. 
One familiar with these studies can never doubt that  enor- 
mous fields of human conduct can be explained without the 
assumption of any other factor than those inherent in the 
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processes themselves. W h a t  now has become of reason 
operating upon and shaping its raw material? Where  is 
place left for  idealism if naturalism shows itself able to 
cover the whole field? 
I t  may be that mind and society are parts of a continu- 
ous and harmonious universe, but it has not yet been p o s ~  
sible to  show that mind is part  of the kind of nature upon 
which mind operates. From its earliest beginnings, intelli- 
gence introduces a new kind of adaptive action; one in which 
individuals shape their conduct in terms of their past ex- 
perience. In its further progress, the business of mind is 
seen increasingly to  be that of directing energies to  precon- 
ceived ends. Soon there comes the mediation of tools, and 
thenceforth human adaptation takes place almost wholly 
as a mental affair. An artificial environment is created to  
mediate between man and his natural environment, as that 
of weapons, clothing, shelter, and appliances for  doing 
things. Reason appears to  be the controlling factor, even 
when it pertains only to  methods of expressing natural ends. 
But not all human aims are natural. Reason selects among 
them and invents new ones. 
T h e  invention of non-natural human aims appears to  be 
a matter of social organization. T h e  need of security 
and welfare are natural motives of all individuals. But 
when they become corporate, they react upon the whole 
body of natural impulses in a way which gives them the 
character of outside forces. Good conduct is group- 
preserving conduct. When natural impulses are antago- 
nistic t o  this new social aim, such impulses are considered 
evil and subjected to  repression and control. This  strug- 
gle of individual impulses and social aims is elevated into 
a cosmic contest between good and evil. T h e  effort is per- 
petually to  remake aims into conformity with social ends. 
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I n  this sense, unsocialized individual ends are natural and 
bad, while ideal ends are a social product. 
There  are undoubtedly natural forces, always present 
and powerful, motivating the expression of so-called human 
nature. A permanent disharmony between nature and 
ideal, as represented in Asceticism or Puritanism, is impossi- 
ble. Ideal conduct must be consistent with natural factors 
to  the extent of using rather than eliminating them. Such 
direction then becomes continuous with, and a part  of, 
those operative forces that may be regarded as natural. 
T h e  conduct of a work-horse is not natural in the strict 
sense. But no one using an animal of this kind can elimi- 
nate essential characteristics. On the other hand, the train- 
ing produces habits which become determinants of the same 
kind as the habits that might have been formed i f  the horse 
had educated himself. Moreover, in the course of genera- 
tions the essential nature of the animal may have changed 
by selective breeding. This  horse may be studied with re- 
spect to  both heredity and education as a part  of nature 
because of the orderliness of his conduct, and because it is 
determined by inherent forces. But the whole affair is the 
product of deliberate design operating from outside. 
T h e  matter is much more complicated with humans, but 
of the same kind. T h e  selective and guiding agency is the 
organized group. This becomes concrete in various ways. 
Most  deities are so obviously tribal or communitary, and 
their codes so clearly intend to  make individually deter- 
mined into socially guided conduct, that it is hardly possi- 
ble to  miss their true significance. When the social ends 
become embodied as also individual ends, the whole proc- 
ess becomes again a part  of nature in the sense of operating 
through inherent forces. Any student of savagery is aware 
that here are human beings, often very fine, whose essential 
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nature does not provide for  cooperative and continuous 
labor. It must have required many generations of harsh 
selection before work became a possibility. T h e  process is 
still incomplete, and the selective method known as slavery 
has only closed within living memory. T h e  educational ap- 
prenticeship must, of course, always go on. Yet we are able 
to  study the conduct of an industrial population as we can 
study a hive of bees. I t  is orderly, and determined through 
inherent causes. 
Group processes are not natural in the physical or bio- 
logical sense of sequential causation, but ideo-natural, in 
that the shaping agent operates from outside by some kind 
of design. 
T h e  foregoing discussion outlines a possible way of solv- 
ing the antithesis of voluntarism and determinism, or, stated 
in other terms, of idealism and naturalism. It is an antith- 
esis which inevitably appears in theories about society and 
is a t  times most troublesome. I t  shows itself in current 
discussions of evolution. There  is an almost instinctive 
revolt against an interpretation which hands human life 
and destiny over t o  the operation of blind natural forces. 
On the other hand, it is quite clear that social forces are in 
operation, that civilization is a thing of growth, that  socie- 
ties are self-controlling, that  nations are self-governing. 
But we are equally aware that human progress is a thing of 
thought, foresight, and design, that an industrial civiliza- 
tion, for example, involves the deliberate application of 
knowledge, that a democracy needs the finest and wisest 
quality of leadership. Civilization moves through an in- 
finite number of acts of design, shaped toward ideal ends; 
but this action of reason is engulfed by, and made a part  
of, the great self-operating total of things human and 
social. 
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W e  can now, perhaps, venture to  define the social phi- 
losophy of Francis Bacon. Fo r  him, humans were merely 
persons ordered and directed by a governmental machinery 
of which they were in no way parts. H e  was a thorough- 
going Utopian. His ideal commonwealth was one in which 
a wise prince could discover, and use for the welfare of his 
subjects, the riches of natural science. 
JOHN WILLIS LAUGHTER. 
